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In this paper, we describe a secure cluster-routing protocol based on a multilayer scheme in ad hoc networks. This work provides
scalable, threshold authentication scheme in ad hoc networks. We present detailed security threats against ad hoc routing proto-
cols, specifically examining cluster-based routing. Our proposed protocol, called “authentication based on multilayer clustering
for ad hoc networks” (AMCAN), designs an end-to-end authentication protocol that relies on mutual trust between nodes in
other clusters. The AMCAN strategy takes advantage of a multilayer architecture that is designed for an authentication protocol in
a cluster head (CH) using a new concept of control cluster head (CCH) scheme. We propose an authentication protocol that uses
certificates containing an asymmetric key and a multilayer architecture so that the CCH is achieved using the threshold scheme,
thereby reducing the computational overhead and successfully defeating all identified attacks. We also use a more extensive area,
such as a CCH, using an identification protocol to build a highly secure, highly available authentication service, which forms the
core of our security framework.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks consist of devices that are au-
tonomously self-organized into networks. In ad hoc net-
works, the devices themselves are the network, and this
allows seamless communication, at low cost, with a self-
organizing capability, which makes mobile ad hoc networks
completely diﬀerent from any other networking solution.
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Mobile ad hoc networking is one of the most innovative and
challenging areas of wireless networking. Ad hoc networks
are a key step in the evolution of wireless networks. An ad
hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile hosts forming a
temporary network without the aid of any established infras-
tructure or centralized administration. Securing an ad hoc
routing protocol presents challenges because each user brings
their ownmobile unit to the network, without the centralized
policy or control of a traditional network. Many ad hoc rout-
ing protocols have been proposed, and clustering-based pro-
tocols include “cluster-based routing protocol” (CBRP) [1],
“adaptive routing using clustered hierarchies” (ARCH) [2],
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the “distributed clustering algorithm” (DCA) [3], and “dis-
tributed mobility-adaptive clustering” (DMAC) [3]. Mobile
ad hoc networks’ security issues have became a central con-
cern and are increasingly important. Ad hoc networks can-
not be used in practice if they are not secure, because ad hoc
networks are subject to various attacks. Wireless communi-
cation links can be intercepted without noticeable eﬀort, and
communication protocols in all layers are vulnerable to spe-
cific attacks [4]. Studies of secure cluster routing based on
multiple layers in ad hoc networks have been carried out us-
ing “authenticated routing for ad hoc networks” (ARAN) [5]
and in [4, 6].
In this paper, we demonstrate possible ways to exploit ad
hoc routing protocols, define various security environments,
and oﬀer a secure solution with “authentication based on
multilayer clustering for ad hoc networks” (AMCAN). We
detail the ways to exploit protocols that are under consid-
eration by [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
Our proposed protocol detects and protects against ma-
licious actions by multilayer parties in one particular ad hoc
environment. We propose an authentication protocol that
uses certificates containing a Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement
and a multilayer architecture so that CCH is achieved using
the threshold scheme, so that the number of essential encryp-
tions reduces the computational overhead and successfully
defeats all identified attacks.
Our evaluations show that AMCAN has minimal perfor-
mance costs in terms of processing and networking overhead
for the increased security that it oﬀers. While this basic idea
has been proposed before in [2, 3, 5], we are the first to apply
it to a clustered network. Our algorithm addresses issues of
authentication andmultilayer security architecture and helps
to adapt the complexity to the scalability of mobile end sys-
tems. Moreover, an extensive evaluation involves the reduc-
tion of CH traﬃc using CCH.
In this paper, we first overview cluster routing pro-
tocols in ad hoc networks, and briefly overview security
goals, common techniques for authentication, and thresh-
old cryptosystems, as well as related work for securing ad
hoc networks in Section 2. Section 3 describes our secu-
rity concept in detail as a CCH construction algorithm and
presents authentication based on multilayer clustering for
ad hoc networks (AMCAN). An important contribution of
our work is the evaluation of the CCH construction and
security architecture in Section 4. Those measurements are
based on diﬀerent authentication models, which are pre-
sented in this section, and we also show the results of se-
curity and network performance analyses of AMCAN. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes the paper and considers further re-
search.
2. RELATEDWORK
There are numerous proposals for clustering and multilayer
routing schemes. This section presents two aspects of AM-
CAN, including those that are most closely related to the
cluster organization and security requirements in ad hoc net-
works.
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C





Figure 1: Clustering-based architecture.
2.1. Clustering in ad hoc networks
A comprehensive overview of diﬀerent clustering strategies
is presented in [8]. In this section, we present several of the
cluster-based control structures and associated control algo-
rithms that have been proposed for use in large dynamic
networks. A cluster-based control structure promotes more
eﬃcient use of resources in controlling large dynamic net-
works. With cluster-based control, the physical network is
transformed into a virtual network of interconnected node
clusters. Each cluster has one or more controllers acting on
its behalf to make control decisions for cluster members and,
in some cases, to construct and distribute representations of
cluster state for use outside the cluster [2, 8].
CBRP [1] is a routing protocol designed for use in mo-
bile ad hoc networks. The protocol divides the nodes of the
ad hoc network into a number of overlapping or disjoint
two-hop-diameter clusters using a distributed method. The
cluster-based architecture was devised tominimize the flood-
ing of route discovery packets. This kind of architecture is
most suitable for large networks with several nodes. The
entire network is divided into a number of overlapping or
disjoint two-hop-diameter clusters, as shown in Figure 1. A
cluster head (CH) is elected for each cluster to maintain clus-
ter membership information. A cluster is identified by its CH
ID. Intercluster routes are discovered dynamically using the
cluster membership information kept by each CH. By clus-
tering nodes into groups, the protocol eﬃciently minimizes
the flooding traﬃc during route discovery and speeds up this
process. A node regards itself as being in a cluster if it has
a bidirectional link to the head of the cluster. In the current
implementation of CBRP, the node with the lowest node ID
is elected as the CH.
All of the nodes broadcast a HELLOmessage periodically.
The HELLO message also contains tables carrying infor-
mation about the neighboring nodes and adjacent clusters.
These HELLO messages are useful for maintaining up-to-
date two-hop topology. An in-depth study of cluster-based
networks has been published [1].
ARCH builds on the foundations of adaptive routing us-
ing clusters (ARC) [2] to create a multilevel hierarchy that is
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able to adjust its depth dynamically in response to the chang-
ing conditions of the network. ARCH conforms to the max-
imum hierarchical depths proven to be the theoretical opti-
mum. As such, the protocol lends itself well to hierarchical
addressing structures. When used with hierarchical address-
ing, it should be extremely beneficial for reducing routing
table size.
2.2. Security protocol in ad hoc networks
The security requirement, which typically strives for ad hoc
networks security goals like authentication, availability, con-
fidentiality, integrity, and the nonrepudiation of communi-
cating entities, is of particular importance as it forms the
basis for achieving the other security goals. Encryption of
ad hoc networks security is worthless if the communica-
tion partners have not verified their identities beforehand.
Authentication of entities and messages is realized in dif-
ferent ways using either symmetric or asymmetric crypto-
graphic algorithms. Authentication enables a node to ensure
the identity of the peer node that it is in communication
with. Without this, an attacker could impersonate a node,
thereby gaining unauthorized access to a resource and sensi-
tive information and interfering with the operation of other
nodes.
While a symmetric algorithm depends on the existence
of a preshared key, authentication using asymmetric cryp-
tography requires a secure mapping of public key infrastruc-
tures (PKI). PKIs use digitally signed certificates to verify a
key owner’s identity. Each user has to prove their identity to
a certification authority (CA) and in turn receives a digitally
signed certificate proving the ownership of the public key.
Distributing the signing key and the functionality of a CA
over a number of diﬀerent nodes by means of secret shar-
ing and threshold cryptography is a possible solution to this
problem, as we will study here [4].
Threshold cryptosystem
A threshold cryptosystem is a distributed implementation
of a cryptosystem, in which the secret key is a secret that is
shared among a group of nodes. These nodes can then de-
crypt or sign messages by following a distributed protocol.
The goal of a threshold scheme is to protect the secret key in
a fault-tolerant way. Namely, the key remains secret, and cor-
rect decryptions or signatures are always computed, even if
the adversary corrupts less than a fixed threshold of the node.
Desmedt and Frankel introduced threshold cryptosystems
[13]. In particular, they presented a threshold cryptosystem
based on the Diﬃe-Hellman problem. The secret sharing
scheme [14] is important for threshold cryptosystems. The
idea of secret sharing is to start with a secret, and divide it
into pieces called shares, which are distributed amongst users
such that the pooled shares of specific subsets of users al-
low reconstruction of the original secret. We now describe
the Shamir (t · n)-threshold secret sharing scheme. Suppose
p and q are large primes such that q divides p − 1, and g
is an element of order 1 in Z. It is assumed that p, q, and
g are known publicly. Unless otherwise stated, all arithmetic
Table 1: Variables and notation used in ARAN.
KA+: public key of node A.
KA−: private key of node A.
{d}KA+: encryption of data d with key KA+.
certA: certificate belonging to node A.
t: timestamp.
e: certificate expiration time.
NA: nonce issued by node A.
IPA: IP address of node A.
RDP: route discovery packet identifier.
REP: REPly packet identifier.
SPC: shortest path confirmation packet identifier.
RSP: recorded shortest path packet identifier.
ERR: ERRor packet identifier.
will be computed modulo p. The scheme is described in the
following protocol. Distribution of trust in our key manage-
ment service is accomplished using threshold cryptography
[16, 17]. An (n, t + 1)-threshold cryptography scheme allows
n parties to share the ability to perform a cryptographic op-
eration so that any t + 1 parties can perform this operation
jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most t parties to do so,
even by collusion.
ARAN protocol
The ARAN protocol can detect and protect against mali-
cious actions by third parties and in the ad hoc environment.
ARAN is composed of two distinct stages. The first stage is
simple and requires little extra work from peers beyond tra-
ditional ad hoc protocols. Nodes that perform the optional
second stage increase the security of their route, but incur
an additional cost for their ad hoc peers who may not com-
ply. ARAN makes use of cryptographic certificates for the
purposes of authentication and nonrepudiation. It consists
of a preliminary certification process, a mandatory end-to-
end authentication stage, and an optional second stage that
provides secure shortest paths. The optional stage is consid-
erably more expensive than providing end-to-end authenti-
cation. There are twelve steps necessary to implement ARAN
[5].
In [5], vulnerabilities and attacks specific to AODV and
DSR protocols are discussed and the two protocols are com-
pared with the ARAN protocol. The ARAN protocol uses a
preliminary cryptographic certification process, followed by
an end-to-end route authentication process, which ensures
secure route establishment. The protocol does not specify any
specific key distribution algorithm. On joining the network,
each node receives a certificate from the trusted server.
In this partition, we briefly review ARAN protocol. We
first describe the notations used throughout this paper in
Table 1.
There are totally twelve steps to implement ARAN:
(1) T→ A: certA = [IPA,KA+, t, e]KT−,
(2) A→ broadcast:[RDP, IPX, certA,NA, t]KA−,
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Figure 2: ARAN simple ad hoc network model.
(3) B→ broadcast:
[[RDP, IPX, certA,NA, t]KA−]KB−, certB,
(4) C→ broadcast: [[RDP, IPX, certA,NA, t]KA−]KC−, certC,
(5) X→ D: [REP, IPA, certX,NA, t]KX−,
(6) D→ C: [[REP, IPA, certX,NA, t]KX−]KD−, certC,
(7) C→ B: [[REP, IPA, certX,NA, t]KX−]KC−, certC,
(8) A→ broadcast: SPC, IPX, certX,
{[IPX, certA,NA, t]KA−}KX+,
(9) B→ broadcast: IPX, certX, SPC, IPX, certX,
{[{[IPX, certA,NA, t]KA−}KX+]KB−, certB}KX+,
(10) X→ D: [RSP, IPA, certX,NA, route]KX−,
(11) B→ C: [ERR, IPA, IPX, certC,NB, t]KB−,
(12) T→ broadcast: [revoke, certr]KT−.
Figure 2 shows totally how to process ARAN situation.
The idea to use a distributed certification authority based on
a shared certification key and threshold cryptography for se-
curing ad hoc networks was presented by [15]. Our approach
is based on modification idea of ARAN protocol used by
[5, 15], but introduces several new concepts, like a cluster-
based network architecture, a process for admitting new par-
ticipants, and end-to-end access control within the multi-
layer in the ad hoc networks. The ARAN protocol cannot be
a configuration for a large area. If ARAN is large area, ARAN
has a lot of overhead.
In this paper, we show how our proposed AMCAN re-
duces the computational overhead and successfully defeats
all identified attacks in a large area.
3. AUTHENTICATION BASED ONMULTILAYER
CLUSTERING FOR ADHOC NETWORKS
3.1. Scenario for an experiment in AMCAN
Our proposed scheme is based on the following assump-
tions. First, mobile nodes in an ad hoc network usually com-
municate with one another via an error-prone, bandwidth-
constrained, insecure wireless channel. The physical layer
of the network is vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks. As there is no way to protect from DoS attacks, we do
not consider physical attacks. Second, the CH knows which
nodes are in its own cluster. Therefore, the CH manages the
IDs of cluster members (i.e., when the CH receives a commu-
nication request, it can identify members of its own cluster).
Third, we consider CH a trusted member. The CH is similar
to the server in [15]. Actually, one can trust the section area
CH, even if a member node is abnormal. Therefore, we used
the CCH (control cluster head) key in a network. Finally, the
CCH selected always trusts CH.
The AMCAN protocol requires the use of a trusted cer-
tificate server T (CCH) in a cluster. A CH is a certificate
server T for authenticated nodes in a cluster. A CCH authen-
ticates the CH for the CCH private key. A CCH is a root-layer
certificate trust server. CH certification uses communication
between the nodes in a cluster. All the nodes of a network
know the public key for the system. Suppose that we have a
pair of public and private keys. The CCH and CH use the
certificates to keep the Diﬃe-Hellman key [17] agreement.
Our proposed scheme should minimize the communication
load in order to extend the overall lifetime of the system. The
CH knows who is in its own cluster. We use the key when ex-
changing certificates to enable secure communication. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 illustrate how the service is configured. More-
over, we propose applying the use of ID-based [18, 19] cryp-
tography to abate the overhead eﬀect on exchanging the pub-
lic key. ID-based public key exchange is weighted more than
the RSA algorithm. An ID-based public key is suitable in a
mobile ad hoc network.
3.2. Configuration of amultilayer cluster
In this section, we describe an eﬃcient authentication algo-
rithm for the set up and maintenance of cluster organiza-
tion in the presence of node mobility that modify, thus sat-
isfying the DMAC and the ARCH for the ad hoc clustering
routing protocol. We make two main modifications to the
original DMAC and ARCH algorithms as shown in Figures 3
and 4.We use the concept of low-maintenance clustering and
mobility-aware clustering schemes. Low-maintenance clus-
tering schemes aim at providing stable cluster architecture
for upper-layer protocols with little cluster maintenance cost.
By limiting reclustering situations or minimizing explicit
control messages for clustering, the cluster structure can be
maintained well without excessive consumption of network
resources for cluster maintenance. Mobility-aware clustering
takes the mobility behavior of mobile nodes into considera-
tion. This is because the mobile node’s movement is the main
cause of changes to the network topology. By grouping mo-
bile nodes with similar speed into the same cluster, the intra-
cluster links can be greatly tightened and the cluster structure
can be correspondingly stabilized in the face of moving mo-
bile nodes. The cluster topology is initialized and maintained
through the periodic transmission of HELLO messages by
each node. This makes this algorithm suitable for both clus-
tering set up and maintenance authentication from the CH,
which was not available in authentication solutions.
3.2.1. CH selection algorithm
The selection of the CH uses the DMAC algorithm in [3].
The DMAC in our clustering algorithm includes only two
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Figure 3: The CH selected when joining a CH between cluster A and cluster B (parameter priority lowest ID: A > B in cluster, 1 > 2 > 3 >
4 > 5 in nodes) (a) Normal cluster. (b) Cluster A moves CHB into cluster B.
conditions to change the CH. Figure 3 shows the DMAC state
in the two conditions. One is when two CHs come within the
range of each other, another is when a node becomes discon-
nected from any other cluster. This is an improvement over
existing algorithms, which select the CH every time the clus-
ter membership changes. The DMAC algorithm assumes that
a message sent by a node is received correctly within a finite
time by all its neighbors. The DMAC also assumes that each
node knows its own ID, weight, and role of all its neighbors.
In addition, each node knows its power of nodes.
Here, we use the same two types of messages used in the
DCA (namely, Ch(v) and Join(v,u)) [3]. In the following we
use Cluster(v) and ClusterHead to indicate the set of nodes
in the cluster whose ClusterHead is v and the ClusterHead
of a node’s cluster, respectively. v’s Boolean variable Ch(v)
is set to true if v has sent a Ch message. Its variables Cluster-
Head, Ch(·), and Cluster(·) are initialized to nil, false, and φ,
respectively. The following is the description of the two M-
procedures as executed at each node v. In DCA algorithm, on
receiving a Ch message from a neighbor u, node v checks if
it has received from all its neighbors z, such that wz > wu, a
Join(z, x) message. In this case, v will not receive a Ch mes-
sage from these z, and u is the node with the biggest weight
in v’s neighborhood that has sent a Ch message.
At the clustering set up, or when a node v is added to
the network, it executes the CH selection procedure (see
Algorithm 1) in order to determine its own role. If its neigh-
bors include at least one CHwith a greater weight, then v will
join it. Otherwise it will be a CH [3].
Initialize
begin
if {z∈(v) : wz>wv ∧ Ch(z)} = φ
then begin













if (wu > wClusterHead) then begin
send Join(v,u);
ClusterHead: = u;
if Ch(v) then Ch(v) := false
end
end;
Algorithm 1: CH selection procedure.
At the clustering set up, or when a node v is added to
the network, it executes the procedure Initialize in order to
determine its own role. If among its neighbors there is at least
a cluster head with bigger weight, then v will join it. Notice
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Figure 4: CCH selection process with multiple layers (parameter
priority lowest ID : B > A> C in cluster, 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 > 5 in nodes).
that a neighbor with a bigger weight that has not decided its
role yet will eventually send a message. If this message is a
Ch message, then v will aﬃliate with the new cluster head.
When a neighbor u becomes a cluster head, on receiving the
corresponding Ch message, node v checks if it has to aﬃliate
with u, and it checks whether wn is bigger than the weight
of v’s cluster head or not. In this case, independently of its
current role, v joins u’s cluster [3].
3.2.2. CCH selection algorithm
In this section, our proposed scheme describes the CCH
for managing a CH. The CCH selection scheme uses the
ARCH algorithm. The CCH has information on all the CHs
and takes charge of certificates between CHs. AMCAN uses
the ARAN protocol based on the CCH selection algorithm.
Figure 4 shows the authenticated architecture for multiple
layers using the ARCH algorithm. Source node 1 in cluster
A communicates with destination node 5 in cluster C. Before
designing the details of our algorithm, we noted that the CH
selected the self-stabilizing leader.
On receiving the message Join(u, z), the behavior of node
v depends on whether it is a cluster head or not. In the aﬃr-
mative, v has to check if either u is joining its cluster (z = v:
in this case, u is added to Cluster(v)) or if u belonged to its
cluster and is now joining another cluster (z = v: in this case,
u is removed fromCluster(v)). If v is not a cluster head, it has
to check if u was its cluster head. Only if this is the case, v has
to decide its role: it will join the biggest cluster head x in its
neighborhood such thatwx > wv if such a node exists. Other-
wise, it will be a CCH (ControlClusterHead). The CCH is v.
The CCH roles need slow mobility, lowest of ID, and enough
of energy in CHs. u parameter contents included mobility,
ID, and energy (see Algorithm 2).
3.3. Design of AMCAN
3.3.1. Protocol scheme
In this section, we describe the detailed operation of AM-
CAN. AMCAN consists of a preliminary certification process
begin
if Ch(v)
then if z = v
then Cluster(v) := Cluster(v)∪ {u}
else if u ∈ Cluster(v)
then Cluster(v) := Cluster(v)\{u}
else if ControlClusterHead = u then
if {z ∈ (v) : wz > wv ∧ Ch(z)} = φ
then begin











Algorithm 2: CCH selection procedure.
and three mandatory stages: CCH authentication for CHs,
a node joins a cluster for the first time, and authentication
for end-to-end of session key exchange. So far, we have sur-
veyed several existing solutions for CCH key establishment
based on the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange. These involve
sharing the CCH key communication securely with all mem-
bers. However, as all members share the same secret key, they
cannot communicate with another member using the end-
to-end method. Moreover, if anyone has their key stolen, all
the members must reestablish the CCH key. The core of the
matter is sharing the same secret key with all members. It is
impossible for all members to share one secret key because
all nodes cannot trust each other in an ad hoc network.
For this reason, we classify all members into two types of
trust level: trusted members and untrusted members. Only
the CH for trusted members in a cluster can establish a CCH
key. Untrustedmembers authenticate and communicate with
other untrusted members using a session key, which is gen-
erated by certificate exchange through an authenticated path.
AMCAN achieves end-to-end security services and executes
partial authentication in all clusters.
3.3.2. Systemmodel
There are three diﬀerent scenarios in which authentication
needs to be performed. These are when the CCH authenti-
cates the CH, when a node joins a network for the first time,
and when a node from a cluster wishes to communicate for
end-to-end key exchange. All the CHs have their own pair
of public/private keys and a CCH partition for the stable se-
curity of the network. Nodes communicate using a common
cluster key within the same cluster. Suppose that all nodes
know the public key for the system, and that they have their
own public/private key pair. Outside reply attack on a mes-
sage can be prevented by sending an encrypted timestamp
with the message.
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Table 2: Variables and notation used in AMACN.
CCH: trust server of control CH
CHA: cluster head in cluster A
IDX : identity of X
KS,CH: secret key shared with S and CH
Time1: current time
S: member node in CHA
X: member node in CHB
As large area networks are adaptive to a hierarchical ar-
chitecture, cluster-based networks are used. A large commu-
nication area is divided into several section areas (clusters).
Each section CH can participate in only one section and
manages the communication units (cluster member nodes)
within its section area. Each unit shares a secret key with the
section CHwhen entering a section area. If any unit (S) wants
to communicate with another unit (X) in another section
area, S needs to know whether X wants to communicate with
unit S. If so, they will also want to communicate mutually us-
ing a secure end-to-end method. Therefore, they exchange a
certificate with each other through an authenticated path, so
that they can authenticate each other and establish a session
key for secure end-to-end communication. Figures 4, 6, and
7 illustrate how the service is configured.
3.3.3. Notation
We use the notation listed in Table 2 to describe the proposed
scheme.
3.3.4. CCH authenticated for CH using
threshold cryptosystem
In our case, the n CHs of the key management service share
the ability to sign certificates. For the service to tolerate t
compromised CHs, we use an (n, t +1)-threshold cryptogra-
phy scheme and divide the private key, k, of the service into
n shares (CHA, CHB, CHC), assigning one share to each CH.
We call (CHA, CHB, CHC) sharing of K . Figure 5 illustrates
how the service is configured.
Given a service consisting of three CHs, let K/k be the
public/private key pair of the service. Using a (3,2)-threshold
cryptography scheme, each CHi gets a share si of the private
key k.
For a message m, CHi can generate partial signatures
PS(m, si) using its share si. The correct CHA and CHC both
generate partial signatures and forward the signatures to a
combiner, c. Although CHB fails to submit a partial signa-
ture, c can generate the signature (m)k of m signed by CH
using the private k.
AMCAN consists of a preliminary certification process, a
mandatory end-to-end authentication step, and an optional
second step that provides threshold cryptosystem. Option
step of the AMACN reduced more overhead than end-to-
end authentication of ARAN.
CCH requires the use of a trusted certificate server T [5].























Figure 6: Authentication process for multiple layers within a large
cluster network.
certificate has the following form:









The certificate contains the ID address of the CH, the
public key of the CCH, timestamp Time1 for when the certifi-
cate was created, and time e at which the certificate expires.
These variables are concatenated and signed by the CCH.
Every CH must maintain fresh certificates with the trusted
server and must know the CCH public key. CHA sends a
request message with a timestamp to CCH for a public key
request to communicate with CHB. If sending an encrypted
message, CCH uses a private key that CHA decrypts using the
CCH public key.
3.3.5. A node joins a cluster for the first time
The ID address of the IDCH, node S’s certificate (certS), a
nonce NCH, and the current time t are all signed with A’s pri-
vate key. Each time S performs route discovery, it increases
the nonce monotonically. Nodes then store the nonce they
last saw with its timestamp. In Figure 8, the node S appeared
as nodes 2 and 3:
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(b)
Figure 8: A node joins a cluster for the first time. (a) New node 2
joins cluster A for the first time. (b) Node 3 joins cluster A from
cluster B.
The CH generates a random number NCH and sends it
to entry node A with its own cluster key. Source node A es-
tablishes a path message as a multicast to its own CH. En-
try node A stores a cluster key for communication within the
cluster. The public key for the encryption of random number
NCH is sent to CH.
3.3.6. Authentication for end-to-end of key exchange
So far, we have considered security services for communi-
cation from one cluster member to a cluster head. In an
ad hoc network environment, securing the end-to-end path
from one mobile user to another is the primary concern.
The end-to-end security service minimizes the interference
from intermediate nodes, especially malicious nodes. In this
subsection, we present secure end-to-end authentication and
a key exchange protocol between one cluster member and
another. The end-to-end key exchange progress is described
in Figure 9. The end-to-end key exchange uses the Diﬃe-
Hellman key as the public key.
Figure 6 shows the authentication process for multiple
layers in large ad hoc networks. The CCH authenticates CHs.
There are 7 steps required to implement AMCAN. Figure 9
shows the end-to-end authentication between CHs commu-
nicating after authentication using the CCH.
First, using a previously shared secret key KS,CHA , S sends
a message to CHA requesting communication with X. Since
IDS is encrypted using KS,CHA , other nodes except S and CHA
do not know the node with which S wishes to communicate.
As certS and NS are also encrypted, they can be transferred
securely.
Upon receiving the request, CHA checks that S is a mem-
ber. If so, this equals the progress leaving out steps (2) and
(6) (i.e., CHA = CHC). Otherwise, CHA asks the other clus-
ter heads where X is using the CHC public key, which was
previously established in step (3) between cluster heads. Let
X be a member of CHB.
In step (3), X is informed of the request from S to com-
municate with him. CHC sends S’s certificate along with
NCHC . Upon deriving the public key for S from the certificate,
X calculates the session keyKX,S = (PKS)kX mod p, which will
be shared between S and X. X uses KS,X in step (4) to let CHC
know that it accepts S’s request for communication. CHC and
CHA pass to S the part of themessage in step (4) that contains
X’s confirmation using KS,X. CHC and CHA also forward X’s
certificate to S. Upon receiving a message including X’s cer-
tificate, S can calculate the session key KS,X = (PKX)kS mod p
using PKX derived from certX.
Finally, S and X share the same secret key, and S com-
municates with X by sending back X’s nonce encrypted us-
ing the shared key KS,X. We propose a reliable algorithm that
runs strong authentication for each packet. This time, CCH
performs authentication for all CHs, and CH authenticates
the certification authority (CA) for all nodes in a cluster. The
CH key is used to exchange the session key secretly. There-
fore, all the messages described above can be forwarded for
Authentication Based on Multilayer Clustering 739
Cluster A Cluster C
(2) Search X (include certS)
(1) Request
communication







(3) Inform the request
from S (include certS)
CHA CHC
S X





Figure 9: End-to-end authentication between clusters after the CHs are authenticated from the CCH.
reference by appending them to routing packets when a route
is discovered.
4. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
4.1. Experiment of energy andmobility
becoming a CCH
We used tools within Matlab to simulate the algorithm de-
scribed in Section 3.2 for networks with varying node den-
sity (λ) and diﬀerent values of the parameters p and k. Each
node in the network chooses to become a CH with probabil-
ity p and advertises itself as a CH to the nodes within its radio
range. This advertisement is forwarded to all the nodes that
are no more than k hops away from the CH. Any node that
receives such advertisements and is not itself a CH joins the
cluster of the closest CH. Any node that is neither a CH nor
has joined any cluster itself becomes a CH. Because we have
limited the advertisement forwarding to k hops, if a node
does not receive a CH advertisement within time duration
t (where t units is the time required for data from the CH to
reach any node k hops away) it can infer that it is not within
k hops of any volunteer CH and hence become a forced CH.
Moreover, this limit on the number of hops allows the CH
to schedule periodic transmissions to the processing center.
To generate the network for each simulation experiment, the
location of each node is found by generation of two ran-
dom numbers uniformly distributed in [0, 2a], where 2a is
the length of a side of the square area in which the nodes are
distributed. In all of these experiments, the communication
range of each node was assumed to be 1 unit. To verify that
the optimal values of the parameters p and k of our algo-
rithm computed according to [20] formulae (11) and (13)
do minimize the energy spent in the system, we simulated
our clustering algorithm on node networks with 50, 100, and
200 nodes distributed uniformly in a square area of 10 square
units. We have, without loss of generality, assumed that the
cost of transmitting 1 unit of data is 1 unit of energy. The
processing center is assumed to be located at the center of
the square area. For the first set of simulation experiments,
we considered a range of values for the probability p of be-
coming a CH in the algorithm proposed in Section 3.2. For
each of these probability values, we computed the maximum
number of hops k allowed in a cluster using (13) and used
these values for the maximum number of hops allowed in
a cluster in the simulations. We simulated in a cluster in the
simulations.We simulated the clustering algorithm 100 times
for each density and each of the probability values and used
the average energy consumption over the 100 experiments to
plot the graph in Figures 10 and 11.
4.2. Compare ARAN and AMCAN
In this section, we compare the eﬃciency properties of the
existing CCH key establishment protocol and our proposed
scheme. We also compare end-to-end security and move dis-
tance within a cluster. Table 3 presents the total message and
the total number of move distance operations necessary for
each protocol. The eﬃciency numbers for existing solutions
are given in tables for each protocol. None of the existing so-
lutions achieve end-to-end security. In AMCAN, variable c
is the number of CHs. We assume that CCH establishment
among CHs uses ARCH, CBRP, and DMAC. As AMCAN
also establishes authentication based on a trust layer, it also
achieves end-to-end security.
We evaluated the performance of our protocol and iden-
tified the advantages and limitations of the proposed ap-
proach. In this paper, our proposed AMCAN protocol is used
in an ad hoc network environment. The certificate mecha-
nism uses the certification method from the ARAN identifi-
cation protocol within a cluster. The CH establishes a mem-
ber node that is worthy of trust by the members of a CH.
Falsehood certification in the certification process can be
achieved. AMCAN is a little more stable for certification of

















Figure 10: Total energy in a network of n nodes distributed in an
area of 10 square units for diﬀerent values of probability of becom-

















Figure 11: Mobility in a network of n nodes distributed in an area
of 10 square units for diﬀerent values of probability of becoming a
CCH in the algorithm in Section 3.2.
CH using CCH and has fewer processing operations. The
ARAN protocol distinguishes the nodes of a local distance
area as a cluster. Table 4 presents AMCAN superior for large
networks as it was designed for use in such networks. The
AMCAN protocol has strong security as it uses the CCH to
obtain a higher level of security than that of ARAN.
The advantages and limitations of the proposed approach
have been identified. The certificate mechanism uses the
certification method of the ARAN identification protocol
within a cluster. AMCAN minimizes the process of chang-
ing certificates by using clustering-routing protocols. An
analysis of its stability verified its authentication, eﬃciency,
safety, and scalability. Authentication and nonrepudiation
use a cryptographic certificate. Each node receives a certifi-
cate from the CH.
We evaluated three performance metrics.
(i) Unauthorized participation: AMCAN participation
accepts only packets that have been signed with a cer-
tified key issued by a trusted authority. There are many
mechanisms for authenticating users to a trusted cer-
tificate authority. The trusted authority is also a single
point of failure attack.
(ii) Spoofed route signaling: since only the source node
can sign using its own private key, nodes cannot spoof
other nodes in route instantiation. Similarly, reply
packets include the destination node’s certificate and
signature, ensuring that only the destination can re-
spond to route discovery.
(iii) Reply attacks: reply attacks are prevented by including
a nonce and a timestamp with the routing message.
AMCANminimizes changes in the certificate process of clus-
ter networks. The analysis of scalability verified the authenti-
cation, eﬃciency, safety, and scalability of the method.
Protocol analysis
We need to show that the above protocol is an AMCAN.
Lemma 1. The protocol described in Section 3 is designed for
AMCAN.
Proof. The protocol can be performed as follows: receiver
CHC authenticates IDS ‖ IDCHA ‖ certS ‖NS for interclus-
ter. Sender CHA sends CCH including IDCHA ‖ IDCHC
‖Time1‖NCHA . AMCAN further improves the stability by the
use of a nonce. AMCAN can reduce system energy use by di-
viding the parts to be handled in each CH. The CCH oﬀers
safe authentication of each node through management of the
CHs.
Computation costs
The computation costs are calculated as
KS,X = (PKX)kS mod p, (3)
and our protocol uses an encryption/decryption protocol
that requires a total of 1 operation of KS,X = (PKX)kS mod p,
which can be computed eﬃciently using the standard AM-
CAN. The CCH is achieved using the threshold scheme,
thereby reducing the computation overhead because the
ARAN protocol step has 12 steps but the AMCAN protocol
step has 7 steps.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined possible methods for use
against ad hoc routing protocols, defined various security
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Encryption algorithm RSA digital signature Diﬃe-Hellman
Total number of session keys n 2
Total number of message n (n: node number) n/c (c: cluster number)
End-to-end security of area X (small area) O (small and large area)
Move distance More 2 hops 2 hops
X : no (impossible), O: yes (possible).








X : no (impossible), O: yes (possible).
environments, and oﬀered a secure solution with authentica-
tion based onmultilayer clustering for ad hoc networks (AM-
CAN). We showed ways to exploit two protocols that are un-
der consideration for clustering-based routing protocols and
the ARAN identification protocol. Clustering-based proto-
cols are eﬃcient in terms of network performance. Our pro-
posed protocol, called AMCAN, detects and protects against
malicious actions across multiple layers and by peers in one
particular ad hoc environment. AMCAN introduces authen-
tication, eﬃciency, safety, and scalability to an ad hoc envi-
ronment as part of a minimal security policy. Our evalua-
tion showed that AMCAN has minimal performance costs
in terms of processing and networking overhead for the in-
creased security that it oﬀers. In this paper, we examined the
certification process for clustering routing protocols in ad
hoc networks, and designed a certification protocol for AM-
CAN. The basic idea of AMCAN is to propose a CCH that
has top-layer authority. We propose an authentication pro-
tocol that uses certificates containing an asymmetric key and
a multilayer architecture so that the CCH is achieved using
the threshold scheme, thereby reducing the computational
overhead and successfully defeating all identified attacks. We
also use a more extensive area, such as a CCH, using an iden-
tification protocol to build a highly secure, highly available
authentication service, which forms the core of our security
framework.
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